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Abstract: The Government of Japan’s “Society 5.0” initiative aims to create a cyber-physical society
in which (among other things) citizens’ daily lives will be enhanced through increasingly close
collaboration with artificially intelligent systems. However, an apparent paradox lies at the heart
of efforts to create a more “human-centered” society in which human beings will live alongside a
proliferating array of increasingly autonomous social robots and embodied AI. This study seeks
to investigate the presumed human-centeredness of Society 5.0 by comparing its makeup with
that of earlier societies. By distinguishing “technological” and “non-technological” processes of
posthumanization and applying a phenomenological anthropological model, this study demonstrates:
(1) how the diverse types of human and non-human members expected to participate in Society 5.0
differ qualitatively from one another; (2) how the dynamics that will shape the membership of Society
5.0 can be conceptualized; and (3) how the anticipated membership of Society 5.0 differs from that of
Societies 1.0 through 4.0. This study describes six categories of prospective human and non-human
members of Society 5.0 and shows that all six have analogues in earlier societies, which suggests that
social scientific analysis of past societies may shed unexpected light on the nature of Society 5.0.
Keywords: Society 5.0; cyber-physical societies; technological posthumanization; human-robot
interaction; human-computer interface; philosophical anthropology; phenomenological anthropology;
posthumanism; Ingarden; Industry 4.0
1. Introduction
The Government of Japan’s Society 5.0 initiative seeks to employ emerging technologies to create
a “super smart” cyber-physical society that is more “human-centered” (Harayama 2017, pp. 8, 10)
than our current information society. However, an apparent paradox exists in any attempt to
create a more human-centered society that involves surrounding the society’s human members
with rapidly expanding quantities and kinds of social robots, artificial agents, and other artificially
intelligent entities that do not simply exist as passive tools to carry out the instructions of human
operators but are instead able to learn, decide, and act for themselves in increasingly autonomous
ways (Government of Japan 2016a, p. 13). Is such a society better understood as being “more”
human-centered than past societies or “less” human-centered?
As a step toward resolving this ambiguity in the Society 5.0 paradigm, this study attempts to clarify
exactly who will constitute the “members” of Society 5.0. It provides a systematic classification of the
diverse types of human and non-human entities that can be expected to participate in Society 5.0, as well
as an analysis of the societal dynamics that are leading to the emergence of such entities. By employing a
qualitative anthropological approach that draws on (a) the concept of societal “posthumanization” found
within critical and philosophical posthumanism and (b) Ingarden’s phenomenologically grounded
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model of the human being as a three-layered emergent whole, this study shows how the diverse human,
robotic, and other anticipated participants in Society 5.0 differ qualitatively from one another and from
the members of previous societies. Its categorization and analysis of the prospective membership of
Society 5.0 illustrates that while the robotic, artificially intelligent, and technologically augmented
human members of Society 5.0 may appear to be radically novel in nature, because of their reliance
on futuristic technologies, they are actually the latest examples of categories of societal participants
that have existed since Society 1.0 and the earliest human civilizations. It is hoped that this study’s
investigation of such issues can provide a clearer conceptual foundation for further research into
the many ethical, legal, economic, philosophical, cultural, engineering, cybersecurity, public health,
and risk-management questions (Government of Japan 2016a, 2016b; Takahashi 2018) raised by Japan’s
efforts to realize Society 5.0.
1.1. Japan’s Strategic Initiative to Bring about “Society 5.0”
As part of its Fifth Science and Technology Basic Plan, in 2016, the Government of Japan (2016a, 2016b)
announced its intention of realizing “Society 5.0”, a transformative and strategically critical next stage in the
development of Japanese society that will involve “merging the physical space (real world) and cyberspace
by leveraging ICT to its fullest” (Government of Japan 2016a, p. 13), thereby providing “a common
societal infrastructure for prosperity based on an advanced service platform” (Iwano et al. 2017, p. 1).
Japanese governmental agencies, universities, and businesses are actively collaborating in development
and implementation of the Society 5.0 paradigm (Government of Japan 2016b; Harayama 2017;
Prasetyo and Arman 2017; Shibata et al. 2017; Ding 2018; Ferreira and Serpa 2018; Fujii et al. 2018).
1.1.1. Society 5.0’s Application of the Industry 4.0 Paradigm
As Ferreira and Serpa (2018) explain in their review of the state of thinking on Society 5.0, Japan’s
Society 5.0 initiative is grounded in the “Industry 4.0” paradigm (Gorecky et al. 2014; Lasi et al. 2014;
Kang 2018) that was developed in Germany in the first half of this decade. In essence, Society 5.0
seeks to take the rapidly evolving technologies that Industry 4.0 employs for production within
businesses and to integrate them more deeply into the everyday lives of ordinary people. While
manifestations of the Industry 4.0 paradigm focus on applying emerging technologies to enhance
organizations’ effectiveness, efficiency, and (ultimately) financial performance, the Society 5.0 initiative
seeks to counterbalance that commercial emphasis by applying emerging technologies relating to
social robotics, embodied AI, the Internet of Things, ambient intelligence, augmented and virtual
reality, and advanced human-computer interfaces to qualitatively enhance the lives of individual
human beings and to benefit society as a whole. If the Industry 4.0 paradigm is understood as focusing
on creation of the “smart factory” (Hozdić 2015; Ferreira and Serpa 2018), then Society 5.0 is geared
toward creating the world’s first “Super Smart Society” (Government of Japan 2016a, p. 11, 2016b, p. 1;
Iwano et al. 2017, p. 1; Harayama 2017; Ferreira and Serpa 2018).
1.1.2. Goals of the Society 5.0 Initiative
The goals of the Society 5.0 initiative are ambitious. As Bryndin (2018, p. 12) notes, the aim
of Society 5.0 is nothing less than the “creation of equal opportunities for all and also providing
the environment for realization” of each individual’s potential; to that end, Society 5.0 will employ
emerging technologies “to remove physical, administrative and social barriers to self-realization of the
person”. Similarly, Keidanren (Japan Business Federation, p. 10), the Japanese Business Federation,
envisions that in Society 5.0, “Every individual including elderly people and women can live [a]
safe and secured comfortable and healthy life and each and every individual can realize his/her
desired lifestyle”. The technologies of Society 5.0 are expected to not simply provide the minimum
services needed for individuals’ survival but to make life more meaningful and enjoyable; within
Society 5.0, human-technology interaction will be harnessed to “provide a sustainable, vibrant, livable
people-centric world” (Medina-Borja 2017, p. 235).
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Society 5.0 is also designed to bring economic benefits for individuals: by “providing the
necessary goods and services to the people who need them at the required time and in just the right
amount”, Society 5.0 will “facilitate human prosperity” (Government of Japan 2016b, p. 1)—supported
by enhanced legal regimes and education that will allow “Dynamic engagement of
all citizens in the new economy and society” made possible by emerging technologies
(Keidanren Japan Business Federation, p. 14).
Beyond enhancing the lives of individual citizens, it is hoped that realization of the Society 5.0
paradigm in Japan will also benefit the nation as a whole: the digital-physical infrastructure of Society
5.0 will be “able to respond precisely to a wide variety of social needs” and will create “a society in
which all kinds of people can readily obtain high-quality services, overcome differences of age, gender,
region, and language, and live vigorous and comfortable lives” (Government of Japan 2016b, p. 1).
Moreover, emerging technologies will be harnessed to solve problems relating to a dramatically aging
society, a shrinking population, and natural disasters in order to realize a “rich and vigourous future”
(Keidanren Japan Business Federation, p. 10). Ways in which implementation of the Society 5.0
paradigm might simultaneously yield social, economic, and ecological benefits that enhance a society’s
sustainability and stability have been explored, for example, by Bryndin (2018).
1.1.3. Riskiness of the Society 5.0 Initiative
The Government of Japan (2016a) acknowledges that the Society 5.0 initiative is a conscious effort
to push discontinuous innovation and the development of high-risk, high-reward technologies; there
is a significant likelihood that some attempts to develop and implement Society 5.0 technologies will
end in costly failure. Moreover, even if the envisioned technological platforms can be effectively
implemented, there is a danger that their use by citizens may yield detrimental side-effects. For example,
Takahashi (2018, p. 119) investigates the possibility that Society 5.0′s ubiquitous smart systems may
create new risks of addiction similar to those already seen in “internet addiction, online video game
addiction, and smartphone addiction”—while simultaneously exploring the possibility that Society
5.0′s novel technologies might also offer new means for preventing or treating addictions.
The Government of Japan (Government of Japan 2016a, 2016b) also recognizes major cybersecurity
concerns that will be exacerbated by the diversity and heterogeneity of human participants in Society
5.0 and the integration of growing numbers of devices into the Internet of Things. As human beings
incorporate networked technologies and devices ever more deeply into their bodies, minds, and daily
routines in Society 5.0—resulting in a “high degree of merging between cyberspace and the real
world”—the danger increases that successful cyberattacks might have direct and catastrophic effects
on people’s lives (Government of Japan 2016a, p. 14).
1.1.4. Society 5.0′s Dependence on Transformative Future Technologies
The technologies needed to implement the Society 5.0 paradigm do not yet fully exist; creating
them will require further advances in a wide range of fields. For example, the Government of
Japan’s plan (2016b) notes that Society 5.0 will feature enhanced forms of robotics, AI, nanotechnology,
and biotechnology, an enhanced Internet of Things, and further exploitation of Big Data. In light of
that reality, Kitsuregawa (2018) has investigated the need (and potential) for Society 5.0 platforms to
employ Big Data approaches that can successfully handle the vast quantities of data generated by the
Internet of Things, while Prasetyo and Arman (2017) have explored the role of next-generation group
management systems in providing a “smart society platform” for Society 5.0.
From the Government of Japan’s perspective (Government of Japan 2016a, pp. 11–12; 2016b, p. 1),
continually pushing the boundaries of knowledge and technology constitutes “the roots of social
transformation” and has the ability to create “groundbreaking value”; it expects that the permeation
by emerging technologies of all spheres of life will “promote economic growth, the formation of a
healthy and long-living society, and social transformation”. However, the unpredictable, disruptive
potential of such technologies is not unreservedly positive: Salgues (2018) suggests that the emerging
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technologies that make implementation of the Society 5.0 vision possible (especially those relating to
robotics, AI, networked digital platforms, and 3D printing) can generate both societal improvement as
well as societal tumult, causing some long-established industries to rapidly vanish while unexpected
new industries materialize to take their place. Indeed, the Government of Japan itself acknowledges
(2016b, p. 1) that emerging technologies have already given rise to an “era of drastic change” in which
structural alterations to social and economic reality are occurring almost daily.
1.1.5. Society 5.0 as the Ultimate Cyber-Physical Society
Both Industry 4.0 and Society 5.0 are premised on the creation of increasingly sophisticated
“cyber–physical systems”, which are characterized by their reliance on embedded, decentralized,
real-time computation occurring within a network of heterogeneous physical objects (Gill 2008;
Wang et al. 2008). When human beings (or social robots or AIs) are functionally integrated
into a cyber-physical system (CPS) at the social, cognitive, and physical levels, it becomes
a “cyber-physical-social system” (CPSS) (Liu et al. 2011) whose members may engage in
“cyber-physical-social behaviours” within cyber-physical spaces (Ren et al. 2018). Through their
interactions with one another, the members of a CPSS may give rise to “cyber-physical social networks”
whose topologies follow the members’ social connections (Ganti et al. 2008).
Even prior to explicit formulation of the Society 5.0 paradigm in Japan, it had been suggested
that the growing use of cyber-physical systems would eventually generate impacts that extend
beyond companies’ internal industrial operations to transform society as a whole. For example,
Monostori (2014, p. 11) suggested that if cyber-physical systems were harnessed to enhance human
quality of life on a large scale, they may result in the creation of a “cyber-physical society, which already
includes human, social, cultural spheres as well, above the physical- and cyber spaces”. Likewise,
Zhuge (2010, p. 1) argued that, “With the rapid development of information technology, the cyber
space is connecting physical space, social space and mental space to form a new world—Cyber Physical
Society”. Such notions of “cyber-physical society” might be seen as conceptual forebears of the Society
5.0 paradigm that has now been developed within Japan—as well as of the similar concept of “Societies
5.0” that has been formulated independently by Wang et al. (2016) and Wang et al. (2018) in a manner
that also builds on the concept of cyber-physical-social systems but is not directly related to the Japanese
Society 5.0 paradigm.
Ferreira and Serpa (2018) make the link between cyber-physical systems and Society 5.0
explicit when they highlight Medina-Borja’s assertion that the “new realm” of Society 5.0 will
encompass a “cyber-physical world” that functions almost symbiotically alongside “the human world”
(Medina-Borja 2017, p. 235). Yasuura (2017, p. 221), too, explicitly describes Society 5.0 as a society
that has truly become a “Cyber-Physical System” that “is the mixture of the real world and the cyber
world connected by ICT”; such cyber-physicalization of its world helps distinguish Society 5.0 from
the four preceding stages of human society.
Indeed, Society 5.0 is premised on a “deepening of technological integration” that supports
“collaboration, co-creation and human-machine interaction” (Ferreira and Serpa 2018, pp. 27–28).
More specifically, it expands Industry 4.0′s pursuit of “an integration between technology, virtual
space and the human being, between the real world and the virtual world” (ibid., p. 27). As
Medina-Borja (2017, p. 235) explains, in future societies, human beings and their natural and artificial
environments will thus become “melded at multiple temporal and spatial scales” to create “cognitive
cooperative systems” and “human-technology partnerships”.
1.2. The Diversified Membership of Society 5.0
Society 5.0 will be increasingly diverse (Government of Japan 2016a); however, such diversity
does not simply involve the inclusion of human beings from different backgrounds. Thanks to its
profoundly technologized, cyber-physical nature, Society 5.0 will be able to incorporate into its societal
structures and dynamics types of beings that had not previously been found within the world’s
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societies. As the Government of Japan (ibid., pp. 13–14) explains, “In order to realize a super smart
society, it is necessary to connect various ‘things’ via a network, create highly advanced systems out
of these things, and integrate several diverse systems so that they can coordinate and collaborate
with each other”; in Society 5.0, the world’s countless disparate “things” will become integrated into
coherent “systems” via cyberspace.
More particularly, at first glance, consideration of the diversified nature of Society 5.0 suggests
that it will involve at least two new types of “members” that were not present in any past human
society, as discussed below.
1.2.1. Autonomous Robots and AIs as Participants in Society 5.0
Beyond its human members, Society 5.0 can be expected to include many types of non-human
intelligent social actors as “participants” or even “members”. For the foreseeable future, such artificial
entities are not expected to merit or receive recognition as moral subjects (e.g., moral agents) or
political persons (e.g., citizens) in the way that human beings are (Wallach and Allen 2008; Gunkel 2012;
Sandberg 2014). Nevertheless, such artificial beings would appear not simply to be passive “tools”
or anonymous parts of the environment; it seems possible that they might be capable of acting as
true (if limited) non-human participants in society, in the same way that house pets and working
animals have long been an integral part of human society in many parts of the world (Cohen 2002;
Haraway 2003; Charles and Davies 2011).
Indeed, just as Society 1.0 and Society 2.0 were defined largely by their incorporation
of wild animals and domesticated animals into humanity’s societal structures and processes
(Government of Japan 2016b; Harayama 2017; Yasuura 2017), it appears that Society 5.0 will differ
from Society 4.0 largely by welcoming into itself a bewildering array of highly sophisticated social and
emotional robots, embodied AI, nanorobotic swarms, artificial life, self-organizing and self-directing
computer networks, artificial agents manifesting themselves within virtual worlds, and other artificial
types of intelligent cyber-physical social actors.
While emerging technologies make the incorporation of diverse types of artificially
intelligent entities into society possible, it is unfavorable demographic and economic realities
that are seemingly making it necessary: Japan’s decreasing birth rate and “hyper-aging society”
(Government of Japan 2016a, p. 61) create an urgent need to address the country’s declining labor
productivity (Harayama 2017). There are not enough human beings capable of performing needed
services; as a result, robots and embodied AI will play increasingly large roles in Society 5.0, thereby
“shaping economic growth” and ideally contributing to “a healthy, long-lived society, which will lead
to further social transformation toward realizing an abundant society in which each individual can
live a vigorous life” (Government of Japan 2016a, p. 13).
The Government of Japan (ibid.) envisions that Society 5.0 will be “an environment in which
humans and robots and/or artificial intelligence (AI) coexist and work to improve quality of life by
offering finely differentiated customized services that meet diverse user needs”. Such accelerating use of
increasingly intelligent robots will no longer be confined to manufacturing but will play growing roles
in “various fields such as communication” and “social service/work assistance” (ibid., pp. 17, 24, 54).
Unlike the types of robots found in our contemporary Society 4.0, the robots of Society 5.0 will not
simply serve as passive tools that require elaborate programming and wait to receive instructions from
their human operators; rather, the robots, AI, and other automated systems and devices of Society 5.0
will demonstrate an increasing degree of autonomy (ibid., p. 13)—proactively gathering data from the
environment, making decisions, and acting in order to provide beneficial services to human beings.
1.2.2. Technologically Altered Human Beings as Participants in Society 5.0
The human beings who are members of Society 5.0 will also find their bodies, minds, and daily
life experiences transformed through the application of futuristic technologies. New types of medical
devices and regenerative medicines and ongoing advances in neuroscience, robotics, AI, and the
Soc. Sci. 2019, 8, 148 6 of 39
Internet of Things “will have a great impact on not only people’s lifestyles” and on their way of being
but also on “the foundation of its existence” (ibid., pp. 3, 22). Likewise, people will spend more time
immersed in and actively exploiting cyberspace, as growing deployment of human-computer interfaces
that incorporate “augmented reality, affective engineering, neuroscience” and other techniques and
insights will create an environment in which “the ‘real world’ and cyberspace have become highly
integrated” (ibid., pp. 11, 17, 26). Such deep integration of emerging technologies into people’s
lives is meant not only to provide the sustenance and care needed for their survival as biological
organisms but also to “guarantee citizens’ richness in minds and high-quality way of life” (ibid., p. 7).
In essence, Society 5.0 is the ultimate realization of the vision of a future high-tech networked society
in which technologically supported human participants engage with robots, AI, and virtual entities in
rich and beneficial ways that was explored in Japanese speculative fiction as early as the late 1980s
(Shirow 2009).
Insofar as not all kinds of augmented reality and immersive VR technologies, neuroprosthetic
implants, nanorobotic medical systems, and other transformative technologies will be needed or
desired equally by all citizens, it can be expected that the diverging manner and degree of the use of
such technologies will create increased diversity among the human members of Society 5.0; in its most
extreme form, the uneven utilization of such technologies might even cause a society to fragment into
numerous subsocieties that share the same geographical space but occupy psychological, cultural, and
technological spaces (and “cyberspaces”) that have little or no overlap between them (McGee 2008;
Warwick 2014; Rubin 2008; Norberg-Schulz 1980; Erk and Uluoğlu 2013).
1.3. The Uncertain Place of Human Beings in Society 5.0
As Ferreira and Serpa (2018) suggest, the large-scale societal change represented by the integration
of artificially intelligent social actors into human society brings with it considerable new practical,
ethical, and security challenges. After all, it is one thing for specially trained employees of an
Industry 4.0 company to spend a limited amount of time interacting with social robots or AIs within a
specially prepared workplace environment in order to carry out some narrowly defined work-related
task (Bradshaw et al. 2009; Gorecky et al. 2014); it is something different for millions of ordinary
individuals—from children to the elderly—to incorporate such intelligent, social, artificial entities into
their homes, their daily routines, and the most intimate aspects of their lives.
One particular locus of ambiguity in the Society 5.0 vision relates to the exact role that human
beings will play within it: it seems possible that the diverse types of robots, advanced AI, sentient
computer networks, responsive smart environments, and other non-human intelligent social actors
who become incorporated into Society 5.0 will not only do work that had been previously performed
by human beings but in some cases may possess physical, intellectual, emotional, and social capacities
that exceed those of the human beings whom they are tasked with serving. Such a society will include
at least two distinct sources of sensing, deciding, and acting: the natural “bioagency” possessed
by human beings and the artificial “cyberagency” possessed by robots and AI (and, potentially,
by neuroprosthetically augmented human persons) (Fleischmann 2009).
With aggressive pursuit of the Society 5.0 initiative, previously abstract and theoretical concerns
about the respective roles of human beings and artificial entities in society become increasingly real.
Indeed, the Government of Japan’s aim in pursuing the Society 5.0 paradigm is to ensure a “prosperous
human-centered society” (Harayama 2017, p. 10)—which suggests that while the Government will
strive to maintain human beings’ position at the core of society, they will not necessarily be alone
within it. Harayama (2017, p. 10), a scientist and government official who played an important role
in the development of the Fifth Science and Technology Basic Plan, appears to acknowledge that it
will be a challenge to ensure that “we humans [ . . . ] remain central actors” in a Society 5.0 that is so
radically transformed by digitalization and innovative technologies; rather than allowing technological
advances to determine the shape and character of society, it will be necessary to continually “focus
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on the word ‘society’ as the foundation for human life”, which involves “focusing on how to build a
society that makes us happy and provides a sense of worth”.
1.4. Research Questions and Objectives
The Government of Japan (2016a, p. 62) recognizes the complex legal and ethical questions
involved with implementation of transformative technologies such as those that provide the foundation
for Society 5.0. Likewise, Ferreira and Serpa (2018) note the urgent need for a broader discussion of the
Society 5.0 initiative and its potential positive and negative implications. We would suggest that before
attempting to investigate such issues in detail, a useful preliminary step is to clarify exactly what types
of human and non-human beings can be expected to participate in Society 5.0 and to identify their
distinguishing characteristics. To that end, this study posed the following research questions:
1. How do the diverse types of human and non-human members that are expected to participate in
Society 5.0 differ qualitatively from one another?
2. How can we conceptualize the societal dynamics that will cause Society 5.0 to possess a different
membership and makeup than our contemporary Society 4.0?
3. How do the anticipated members of Society 5.0 differ qualitatively from the members of Societies
1.0, 2.0, 3.0, and 4.0?
To address those questions, this study formulated and applied two conceptual frameworks: (1) a
posthumanist anthropological model of human history in which Society 5.0 represents an emerging
stage of the world’s “technological re-posthumanization”; and (2) a phenomenological anthropological
analysis of Society 5.0 as a combination of particular types of “natural” biological human beings,
artificially augmented human beings, and metahuman, epihuman, parahuman, and nonhuman beings.
These frameworks are meant to provide tools that can be employed in future interdisciplinary study of
Society 5.0. They are offered as a response to the Government of Japan’s recognition (2016b, p. 1) that
the successful development of Society 5.0 is not simply an IT engineering challenge but will require
insights from “all fields of humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences”.
2. Methodology and Theoretical Background
This study relied on the gathering, analysis, and synthesis of secondary data in the form
of published scholarly texts, and it employed a cross-sectional time horizon and purposive
non-probability sampling method. As placed within the spectrum of research methodologies discussed
by Bryman (2016) and Creswell and Creswell (2018), this study utilized an inductive approach,
qualitative methodology, and phenomenologically-based research philosophy, which—while not
yielding the same type of “reliability” or “validity” sought in positivist quantitative approaches
(Golafshani 2003)—is capable of generating results with significant trustworthiness, credibility,
relevance, and confirmability (Lincoln and Guba 1985).
In order to carry out this study’s analysis of the anticipated membership of Society 5.0, it was
necessary to rely heavily on two resources: (1) the anthropological concept of the “posthumanization” of
societies recently developed among some philosophical and critical posthumanists; and (2) Ingarden’s
anthropological model of the human being as a three-layered emergent whole. Insofar as the
former remains poorly defined in the existing literature and the latter is little-known outside of the
Polish-speaking world, both are presented in some detail below.
2.1. The Anthropological Concept of the “Posthumanization” of Societies
2.1.1. Distinguishing “Posthumanization” from “Posthumanism”
“Posthumanism” can be understood as a diverse collection of scholarly approaches that seek to
analyze phenomena in a way that breaks down traditional conceptual binaries such as those of “human
vs. non-human” and “natural vs. artificial”. Posthumanist scholarship seeks to “de-anthropocentrize”
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our study of societies by arguing, for example, that a society not only includes its human members but
also non-human members such as our house pets or mythical or legendary figures whose existence we
half-believe in. Posthumanism as a distinct and explicitly formulated academic approach is a recent
invention: its origins are often traced to Hassan’s reference to an emerging “posthumanist culture” in
a 1977 journal article (Hassan 1977), and it developed rapidly in the 1980s, eventually giving rise to
variants such as “critical posthumanism” (Herbrechter 2013), “cultural posthumanism” (Miah 2008),
and “philosophical posthumanism” (Miah 2008). Among its better-known theorists, practitioners,
or proponents are scholars such as Badmington (2006); Ferrando (2013); Graham (2002, 2004);
Haraway (1985, 1991, 2003); Hayles (1999, 2005); Herbrechter (2012, 2013); and Roden (2014).
The phenomenon of “posthumanization” is something related but distinct: it encompasses those
processes or dynamics that are actually at work in a given society that have the effect of blurring
the practical barriers between human and non-human and between the natural and the artificial and
that cause the society to become de-anthropocentrized. The result of such dynamics is a society that
has become at least partially “posthumanized”. The processes of posthumanization would have
existed in the world even if posthumanization as an academic approach had never been created,
and the dynamics of posthumanization can be studied using either posthumanist or non-posthumanist
research methodologies.
2.1.2. Defining Posthumanization
While many definitions of “posthumanism” have been formulated and debated, attempts to
develop clear definitions of “posthumanization” remain rare. Those few texts that make explicit
reference to the concept of posthumanization sometimes do so in passing, without specifying in detail
what is meant by that term in the given context (Krustiyati 2012; Trendel 2017).
A few scholars, however, have attempted to develop richer and more nuanced accounts of what is
meant by “posthumanization”. For example, Herbrechter describes the dynamic of “posthumanization
as the disappearance of the modern metanarratives of the Enlightenment and human emancipation”
(Herbrechter 2013, p. 78). Herbrechter’s understanding of posthumanization has been taken up and
analyzed, for example, by (Dönmez 2016).
A review of the (extremely limited) existing literature on posthumanization makes it possible to
identify three related strains of thought, all of which are relevant to posthumanization in the context
of Society 5.0. These are (1) human-machine partnership, (2) human-machine integration, and (3)
expansion of societal membership as manifestations of posthumanization.
2.1.3. Human-Machine Partnership as Posthumanization
The phenomenon of “posthumanization” is often identified with those processes by which
contemporary human beings are growing to collaborate with computerized systems in ever more
frequent, meaningful, and intimate ways. Hansen (2001, p. 63) suggests that such processes are
eagerly welcomed by at least a portion of humanity, discussing “an embrace of a radical, technical
posthumanization” that is seen as being diametrically opposed to “a resistance to humankind’s fall into
technology”. Similarly, Poster (2004, p. 92) writes that “The new economy is one not of humanization
but of posthumanization, of the deep symbiosis of humans with machines. [ . . . .] The digital economy
[ . . . ] organizes production around the partnership of humans with information machines”.
2.1.4. Human-Machine Integration as Posthumanization
For other thinkers, the processes of “posthumanization” go farther and deeper than mere
“collaboration” or “interaction” between human beings and machines. In particular, the concept
of “posthumanization” is sometimes identified with the ongoing processes of “cyborgization”
by which human beings are incorporating computers ever more deeply into their lives, minds,
and bodies. Thus, Herbrechter (2013, p. 3) refers to “the current technology-centred discussion
about the potential transformation of humans into something else (a process that might be called
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‘posthumanization’)”; elsewhere, in discussing the account of “the continuing ‘technical mediation’
of the human” developed by Brewster et al. (2000, p. 9), Herbrechter identifies the process
of “becoming-machine” with “cyborgization as the one, predominantly contemporary, form of
posthumanization” (Herbrechter 2012, pp. 51–52). Similarly, in discussing Smelik (2017) analysis of
film and the posthuman, Clarke and Rossini (2017, p. xix) find cinematic depictions of cyborgs an
embodiment of “profound desires for ‘posthumanization’ through fusion with machines and their
technologies”.
While the physical neuroprosthetic augmentation of human beings’ bodies is one example
of such posthumanization, it can also occur through human–machine integration functioning at a
cognitive rather than a physical structural level; thus, Kim notes that “based on complex computational
infrastructures, the technical distribution of cognition adequately posthumanizes humans even without
including the transformation of the biological body” (Kim 2017, p. 398).
2.1.5. Expansion of Societal Membership as Posthumanization
For some scholars, the processes of “posthumanization” are not restricted to changes occurring
in the minds or bodies of human beings; rather, human society as a whole can undergo a process
of posthumanization (and become “posthumanized”) even if no changes are made directly to the
“internal architecture” of human beings—through the act of incorporating increasingly numerous,
intelligent, and capable artificial beings into that society in the form of social robots, embodied AI,
nanorobotic swarms, sentient computer networks, and other bearers of non-human agency. It is this
type of posthumanization that makes it possible for some to “fear that the human race will become
extinct due to posthumanization”, as Kim (2017, p. 396) observes, before elsewhere arguing (p. 410)
that “Consideration of the posthumanization of the human must expand further from the human
cyborgization based on the anthropo-individual-centric liberal humanism”.
Some concepts of posthumanization explicitly recognize that the phenomenon can manifest
itself either through changes in human beings or in changes to the society that exists around them.
For example, definitions have been proposed that describe the phenomenon of posthumanization
as those processes “by which society comes to include many different types of intelligent social
actors—beyond just natural biological human beings—who seek to perceive, interpret, and influence
their shared environment and who create knowledge and meaning through their networks and
interactions” (Gladden 2017, p. 143) and that assert that “The processes of posthumanization are
those dynamics by which a society comes to include members other than natural biological human
beings who, in one way or another, contribute to the structure, activity, and meaning of the society”
(Gladden 2018, p. 31). Such a concept of posthumanization has been elaborated and applied, for
example, by Grove (2018), in his reconceptualization of the field of knowledge management in the
context of increasingly prevalent forms of artificial agency and “planetary-scale computation”.
In this understanding, a society may become posthumanized as some of its human members
augment themselves cognitively and physically through advanced cybernetic technologies (and thus
cease to be simply “natural biological human beings”) or as robots, AI, and other non-human
intelligent social actors become incorporated into the society. Such a view is suggested, for example,
by Pastourmatzi (2017, pp. 41, 43), who in a reflection on the fiction of Bruce Sterling cites both the
artificial augmentation of human beings’ natural biological brains and the potential future appearance
of highly intelligent “nonhuman postbiological entities” that replace human beings as earth’s dominant
species as examples of “posthumanization”.
2.1.6. Posthumanization in the Context of Society 5.0
Building on and synthesizing the perspectives presented above, the future Society 5.0 can
be understood as “posthumanized” insofar as it is a vast, complex cyber-physical-social system
that encompasses more than simply natural biological human beings as members and participants,
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as illustrated in Figure 1. This study’s identification of the full universe of those participants and
characterization of their differing natures are presented in the Results section below.
Figure 1. A society that has become “posthumanized” no longer has natural biological human beings
as its sole members and participants.
2.2. Ingarden’s Anthropological Model of the Human Being as a Three-Layered Emergent Whole
In order to categorize, describe, and compare the types of “ordinary” human, “otherly” human,
and non-human beings that may become members of Society 5.0, this study relied on the anthropological
model of the human being developed by phenomenologist Roman Ingarden, a student of Husserl
who is considered one of Poland’s greatest 20th-century philosophers, as well as one of the most
influential figures in Polish cybernetics (Sienkiewicz and Wojtala 1991). His lifetime of research was
driven to a great (though often underappreciated) extent by his interest in philosophical anthropology
(Półtawski 1978). While grounded in classical ontology and phenomenology, Ingarden’s model of the
human being as a particular type of “relatively isolated system” also draws extensively on systems
theory, theoretical biology, and developments in modern neuroscience. Ingarden developed his model
through a number of works (Ingarden 1957, 1960, 1961, 1964, 1965b, 1968, 1974), with its most robust
and mature formulation being presented in an exploration of the basis of human freedom (1970).
2.2.1. The Physical Body, Sensory-Emotional “Soul”, and Intentional «I»
Within Ingarden (1970) anthropological framework, the human being can be understood as
an emergent whole that comprises three layers or spheres: (1) a physical body, which is identified
with a person’s “biological organism”; (2) a “soul” that is the site of unconscious (or preconscious)
sensory experiences, emotional states, and personality; and (3) an «I» that enjoys a stream of conscious
awareness and is capable of diverse forms of “intentionality” (Sokolowski 2000), including acts of
thought, reasoning, and volition. The soul is continuously experiencing the totality of sensations and
emotions produced by the body’s interaction with the environment; however, in any given moment,
the intentional «I» focuses its conscious attention on at most a small portion of the contents of the soul
(Ingarden 1970).
Despite its reference to a “soul”, Ingarden’s model is not dualist but arguably emergentist:
he contends that neither the rich experiences of the sensory-emotional soul nor the nuances of thought
of the conscious «I» can be reduced simply to physical activity within the body; nevertheless, the body
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provides the “ontic fundament” (Ingarden 1960, 1961, 1964, 1965a, 1965b) from which the soul arises,
and the «I» arises from the soul as the organizing center that personifies it and speaks on its behalf
(Ingarden 1970, p. 92). Ingarden’s model might thus be compared with contemporary emergentism of
the sort formulated by DeLanda (2011).
2.2.2. The Importance of Semipermeable Boundaries and Partially Sheltered Spaces
For Ingarden, the body is essentially a set of semipermeable membranes that allow some causal
influences from the environment to enter a person’s “soul” and be experienced by it, while selectively
blocking other environmental phenomena from being experienced (Ingarden 1970, pp. 84–85). Similarly,
the mind’s filtering mechanisms relating to memory and attention ensure that in any instant, the «I» of
conscious awareness is able to focus on only the tiniest portion of all that the soul has experienced during
one’s life, allowing one to think clearly without being subjected to an ongoing flood of distractions
(Ingarden 1970, pp. 87–89, 95–96).
As human beings, the interaction of our rich array of semipermeable physical, emotional, and
intellectual boundaries creates an ultimate interior space—the «I» of conscious awareness—that is
both partially exposed to and partially sheltered from the influence of other human beings and the
surrounding environment; it is this complex regulation of our engagement with the ultimate reality of
the world that makes us who we are. Ingarden’s three-layered model may be understood as a sort
of ontologically and phenomenologically grounded philosophical anthropology, situated within the
context of other multilayered, phenomenologically-based accounts of the human being such as those
developed by Scheler (Scheler 1927; Geniusas 2015) and Stein (Stein 1917, 1922, 1998; Sawicki 2000);
Ingarden (1960) acknowledges the influence on his thought of Scheler’s analysis of the human person.
2.2.3. The «I» from a Posthumanist Perspective
Reference to the concept of an intentional «I» may appear controversial in an analysis
of posthumanized societies, as posthumanist thought (broadly understood) includes not only
“neohumanist” thinkers (Herbrechter 2013; Wolin 2006; Nealon 2008) who seek to salvage the
human subject but also post-structuralist “antihumanist” thinkers (Ferrando 2013; Herbrechter 2013)
who have proclaimed the death of the intentional self. For purposes of this study, though, reference to
the «I» can be understood as a descriptive tool rather than a metaphysical claim. Thus, the everyday
experience of suddenly becoming consciously aware of an ongoing sight, sound, or smell that one
had previously not “noticed” might be described from an Ingardenian perspective as “stimuli having
passed from the soul of raw experience ‘into’ the «I» of conscious attention”; here it is not particularly
relevant whether that is taken literally or only metaphorically.
In this regard, Ingarden’s model might be compared to Deleuze’s two-layered anthropological
model of the human being, illustrated in his allegory of the “Baroque house” (Deleuze 1993). Ingarden’s
model is thus by no means the only way in which potential participants in Society 5.0 might be
categorized; however, we would suggest that it offers one useful approach for systematically drawing
such distinctions.
2.3. The Diverse Spectrum of Entities Considered (Potential) Participants in Society
It should be noted that this analysis identifies as potential “participants” in a society many entities
that would not be considered participants in other research contexts. If, for example, one is analyzing a
given society from an epidemiological perspective, one might include as relevant “participants” in the
society not only its human population but also insects, birds, rodents, and other creatures making their
homes in and around human settlements that are capable of serving as disease vectors; however, one
would not include corporations. Conversely, if one is analyzing a society to understand the economic
impacts of the distribution of its tax burden, non-human creatures would be ignored but corporations
would be considered relevant participants, insofar as they are legal persons whose financial activities
are distinct from those of their human officers and employees.
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Corporations (along with “cities”, “states”, “flags”, “money”, mythological and fictional characters,
and many other types of entities) are what Ingarden (1931, 1957, 1960, 1961, 1964, 1965a, 1968) refers
to as “purely intentional objects”: they can indeed be said to “exist” in a particular and limited
fashion—but as mental constructs that depend on human consciousness for their existence in a way
that raw physical matter does not. Although their mode of being as purely intentional objects differs
radically from that of real human beings or other biological organisms, for purposes of this study’s
phenomenological anthropological analysis, even obviously folkloric or fictional characters such as
Bilbo Baggins, Cinderella, Dracula, Godzilla, Sherlock Holmes, Harry Potter, Mr. Spock, and the Tooth
Fairy can be understood to “participate” in a human society by meaningfully influencing the course
and contents of activity within it. Echoes of the Ingardenian concept of purely intentional objects
may be found in the (nevertheless quite different) contemporary concept of “memes” (Dawkins 1989;
Bouissac 1992), which attributes a certain limited type of being and agency to political and religious
ideals and literary or musical motifs themselves, and not just to the human beings who contemplate or
transmit them.
Insofar as such fictional characters drive billions of dollars’ worth of economic activity, inspire
diverse forms of artistic creativity, affect the ways in which leisure time is spent and in which literacy
skills and cultural awareness are acquired, serve as “companions” and role models for many people
(especially the young), and provide a shared social experience and reservoir of cultural metaphors,
such fictional characters arguably play as much of a role in shaping the meaning and activity of society
as do domesticated animals or organizations such as governments and corporations. While the singular
way in which such characters “exist” and influence society clearly places them in a different category
from that of human beings (Thomasson 2003a, 2003b), from an anthropological perspective, ignoring
their existence and dynamic impacts would paint an incomplete picture of a society. Indeed, they
are especially relevant for this study, insofar as the notion of posthumanization provides a further
conceptual basis for rationalizing how such entities might be recognized as “participants” in a society
despite the fact that they are not human beings.
3. Results
3.1. Conceptualizing Society 5.0 as a “Technologically Re-Posthumanized” Society
The Government of Japan (2016b, p. 1) explicitly positions Society 5.0 within the ongoing
development of humanity that has been unfolding since prehistoric times, driven by continual
advances in technology; it describes Society 5.0 as the next step in the evolution of human society that
began with Society 1.0 (“a hunter-gatherer society”) and proceeded through Society 2.0 (“agrarian
society”) and Society 3.0 (“industrial society”) to our current day Society 4.0 (“an information society”).
Harayama (2017, p. 10) elaborates on that analysis, identifying Society 1.0 with “groups of people
hunting and gathering in harmonious coexistence with nature”, Society 2.0 with the formation of
“groups based on agricultural cultivation, increasing organization and nation-building”, Society 3.0
with “a society that promotes industrialization through the Industrial Revolution, making mass
production possible”, and Society 4.0 with “an information society that realizes increasing added value
by connecting intangible assets as information networks”. Like Society 4.0, Society 5.0 is a type of
“information society”; however, it more explicitly applies emerging forms of ICT with the goal of
creating “a prosperous human-centered society”.
While there is much insight in the Government of Japan’s assertion (2016b, p. 1) that “The history
of humankind reveals that the evolution of human society has been fueled by technological advances”
and Harayama (2017, p. 10) statement that “Traditionally, innovation driven by technology has been
responsible for social development”, this study’s results indicate that the evolutionary path that has
led to the advent of Society 5.0 has been a more complex and less linear one. We illustrate this below by
distinguishing between “technological” and “non-technological” forms of posthumanization, in order
to describe the emergence of Society 5.0 as a “technological re-posthumanization” of the world.
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3.1.1. Differentiating Technological from Non-Technological Posthumanization
In today’s world, the processes of posthumanization are often identified with the growing use of
social robots, autonomous AI, and advanced human-computer interfaces. However, if—as discussed
above—posthumanization is understood simply as the processes by which a society comes to include
members and participants other than just natural biological human beings (Gladden 2017, 2018), then
it becomes apparent that the use of emerging 21st-century technologies is not the only way in which a
society might become posthumanized. This fact was hinted at by Clarke and Hansen, who suggest
(Clarke and Hansen 2009, pp. 7–8) that posthumanization can be identified with “an exteriorization
or evolution by means other than life”, which is a trait that humanity has always manifested but
which is now undergoing “massive contemporary acceleration”. Similarly, in analyzing Lyotard’s
essay “A Postmodern Fable”, Herbrechter (2013, p. 7) concludes “that, on the one hand, there is no
point in denying the ongoing technologization of the human species, and, on the other hand, that a
purely technology-centred idea of posthumanization is not enough to escape the humanist paradigm”.
Drawing on Herbrechter (2013, p. 48), Marino-Faza (2017, pp. 138–39) suggests, for example, that the
incorporation of vampires and other undead monsters into our contemporary “cultural imaginary”
represents a form of posthumanization that is driven by “the fear of the different, of the Other” and that
“questions the concept of identity”; such posthumanization is not dependent on emerging technologies.
The heterogeneity of such qualitatively different forms of posthumanization is made explicit in
the distinction between “technological” and “non-technological” posthumanization (Gladden 2016).
Processes of non-technological posthumanization can be understood as the “original” form of
posthumanization, which from ancient times has expanded the boundaries of human societies
to encompass members other than “natural” biological human beings. The Society 5.0 paradigm is most
immediately connected with the dynamics of technological posthumanization; however, by analyzing
and comparing the nature of technological and non-technological posthumanization, it becomes possible
to discern ways in which humanity’s long and rich experience with the dynamics of non-technological
posthumanization may help prepare us for the arrival of Society 5.0 and allow us to conceptualize its
complex and diverse universe of participants.
3.1.2. Three Historical Stages of Posthumanization
Equipped with the distinction between technological and non-technological posthumanization,
it is possible to divide human history into three phases representing (1) the gradual non-technological
posthumanization of ancient societies, roughly identified with Societies 1.0 and 2.0; (2) the
“de-posthumanization” of modern societies that began with Society 3.0 and reached its extreme in Society
4.0, yielding highly anthropocentric societies; and (3) the ongoing technological (re-)posthumanization
of high-tech societies that has begun in the last few decades and which is opening the door to the
development of Society 5.0. This dynamic is illustrated in Figure 2, and each of the phases is considered
in more detail below.
3.1.3. The Non-Technological Posthumanization of Ancient Societies 1.0 and 2.0
As is illustrated in Figure 2, the processes of non-technological posthumanization of human
society began millions of years ago, eventually leading to a state of robust posthumanization of human
societies around the world that continued unbroken throughout ancient times and all the way up to
the 19th century, when it began to weaken. Throughout most of human history, the default condition
of the world’s political states, economies, and cultures was thus one of significant non-technological
posthumanization: for example, the survival and success of many historical civilizations depended on
their use of domesticated animals such as the cows, chickens, or pigs that provided food; the dogs
that assisted with hunting and that protected flocks from predators; the oxen that plowed fields and
powered mills; and the horses that pulled wagons and carried soldiers into battle. Likewise, throughout
the majority of human history, various forms of belief in deities, angels, monsters, and the spirits of
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deceased human beings that are connected with folk spirituality or organized religion have exerted a
strong regulating influence on the expectations for the roles that individual persons and institutions
are supposed to play in society and on the structures and dynamics that members of such societies
create among themselves.
Figure 2. As exemplified by selected historical developments, processes of the (a) non-technological
posthumanization, (b) de-posthumanization, and (c) technological (re-)posthumanization of society
have set the stage for the emergence of Society 5.0.
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The diverse historical examples of Societies 1.0 and 2.0 that incorporated such elements can be
understood as non-technologically posthumanized (and thus partially de-anthropocentrized): while
ordinary human beings stood at the core of those societies, they were by no means the sole “members”
of the societies whose real or supposed existence and activities helped shape the societies’ unique
strengths, weaknesses, and character. Such ordinary human beings knew (or believed) that within such
societies, they “shared the stage” with the animals that they cared for and worked with, the deities that
they believed in, the monsters that lurked at the edges of the known world, and the departed ancestors
that accompanied and protected them—all of whom were incorporated into the societies’ rich fabric.
For many millennia, the effective functioning of non-technologically posthumanized societies
around the world was thus predicated on the inclusion of non-human intelligent social actors in the
structures and activities of state institutions, commercial enterprises, and other organizations. Over
time, such societies’ human members developed robust and meaningful approaches for successfully
collaborating with (or, in the case of imaginary entities, for coming to believe that they were successfully
collaborating with) such non-human intelligent social actors.
As Figure 2 reflects, the gradual non-technological posthumanization of human society through
its expansion to incorporate animals as sources of nourishment, labor, and companionship might be
traced by pointing out selected historical developments ranging from the first hunting of wild animals
by ancestors of modern humans, which occurred around 2 million years ago (Ferraro et al. 2013), to the
domestication of dogs, around 13,000 BC (Larson et al. 2012), the domestication of goats, around 8500
BC (Fernández et al. 2006), the domestication of chickens, which may have occurred well before 2500
BC (Miao et al. 2013), and the domestication of horses, no later than 2000 BC (Jansen et al. 2002).
Similarly, the non-technological posthumanization of ancient societies through their expansion to
incorporate non-human agents in the form of spirits of the deceased, monsters, semidivine heroes,
deities, and forces such as destiny or fate is reflected, for example, in the earliest evidence of purposeful
burials of deceased human beings, which dates to around 120,000 years ago (Pettitt 2010); the earliest
known figurines and paintings that appear to provide evidence for religious belief, dating from around
35,000 years ago (Rossano 2006; Hillar 2012); the earliest shamanistic practices, for which increasingly
suggestive evidence exists from around 15,000 BC (Harvey and Wallis 2016); the establishment of
what some scholars consider to be the earliest known cultic center or temple, Göbekli Tepe, whose
construction likely began sometime before 9000 BC (Magli 2016; Banning 2011); the earliest evidence of
purposeful mummification of bodies of the deceased, sometime prior to 3400 BC (Jones et al. 2014);
and the oldest surviving mythological, magical, and religious texts, including the “Kesh Temple Hymn”
dating to 2600–2500 BC (Biggs 1971; Wright 1980) and the Pyramid Texts of Egypt’s Old Kingdom,
dating from before 2300 BC (Allen 2005).
3.1.4. The De-Posthumanization of Modern Societies 3.0 and 4.0
In Western societies, the powerful state of non-technological posthumanization that had existed
since ancient times arguably started to break down in the early 19th century, as the industrialization of
agricultural and manufacturing processes began to force animals out of their critical societal roles and
Post-Enlightenment thinking began to challenge traditional spiritual beliefs and religious practices
and to create a growing strain of secular culture.
As Figure 2 indicates, with the arrival of the First Industrial Revolution around the year 1800,
the world’s more advanced economies began to mechanize many processes that previously required
intensive labor on the part of animals. Thus, by the 1830s, in many places, steam locomotives were
being used to transport goods overland, replacing pack animals and the horses or oxen that had
previously drawn carriages and wagons (Gibbs 2012). Likewise, in more technologically advanced
regions of the globe, the rise of steam-powered mills eliminated the role that horses, oxen, and other
animals had previously played in powering local mills (Temin 1966; Tarr and McShane 2008). During
the 1920s, as part of the Second Industrial Revolution, horses and oxen that had previously been
widely used for personal transportation and work on family farms were in many areas replaced with
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automobiles and gasoline-powered tractors (Schlebecker 1975; Parissien 2013). The development
of new chemical industries also played a role in de-posthumanizing societies: for example, the rat
terriers that had previously been ubiquitous on family farms throughout the United States—because of
their ability to catch vermin—began a rapid decline in numbers in the 1950s, because the widespread
introduction of chemical pesticides had rendered them functionally obsolete (Kane 2003). Similarly,
since the middle of the 20th century, societies with developed economies have (on the whole) become
more secularized and less spiritual (Johnson and Grim 2013), their birth rates have fallen, and elderly
family members are increasingly housed in specialized facilities rather than in the home with their
adult children (McDaniel and Zimmer 2016).
While significant variations exist between contemporary societies, it is thus generally less likely
in the world’s more technologically and economically advanced societies that adults now share a
home with large numbers of children, elderly parents, and extended family members (McDaniel and
Zimmer 2016); that individuals acknowledge some religious affiliation and a belief in ghosts, angels,
deities, or other supernatural entities or forces (Johnson and Grim 2013); that wild animals are routinely
encountered by people in their everyday lives; that families raise their own animals as a source of food
or raw materials for clothing and tools; and that domesticated animals are employed as a source of
power or for transportation, farm work, and other forms of labor (Wilks 1999; Common and Stagl 2005;
Pingali 2007).
Instead of experiencing extensive and diverse daily social interaction with (or, at least, social
behaviors directed at) wild animals, farm animals, children, elderly relatives, deities, ghosts, or angels,
the typical adult member of the workforce in a Society 4.0 economy came to have a much more
homogenized and “de-posthumanized” everyday life experience than was true in earlier ages: to a
significant degree, the daily face-to-face social experience of adult members of the workforce became
confined to interaction with other adult members of the workforce. It is that status quo of the late
20th century that now promises to be upended by the “re-posthumanization” of society that is
exemplified by the Society 5.0 paradigm—however, this time, such processes of posthumanization will
be manifested not in the ubiquitous presence of farm animals but in growing societal roles for social
robots, autonomous AI, and cyborgs.
3.1.5. The Technological (Re-)Posthumanization of Emerging Society 5.0
There are two complementary ways (Gladden 2016) in which contemporary societies are already
becoming technologically posthumanized, offering hints of what is to come with Society 5.0. First,
human beings are becoming more closely integrated with artificial devices and systems (and thereby
becoming more “computer-like”). Second, computers are developing greater intelligence and more
social, emotional, learning, and evolutionary capacities (and thereby becoming more “human-like”).
The first dynamic is exemplified by human beings’ growing use of mobile and wearable devices
(Castells et al. 2007; Ernst 2016; Delabrida Silva et al. 2018), online social media (Sahlin 2015) and
e-commerce (Qin et al. 2014), augmented and virtual reality systems (Bainbridge 2011; Craig 2013;
Jerald 2015; Aukstakalnis 2017), and neuroprosthetic devices developed for purposes of therapy or
human enhancement (Merkel et al. 2007; Gasson 2008; McGee 2008; Fleischmann 2009; Fairclough 2010;
Gasson et al. 2012). The second dynamic is exemplified by the increasing sophistication and expanding
use of technologies relating to social and emotional robotics (Breazeal 2003; Bradshaw et al. 2009;
Kanda and Ishiguro 2013; Vallverdú 2015), the pursuit of artificial general intelligence (Gunkel 2012;
Pearce 2012; Yampolskiy and Fox 2012; Ramamoorthy and Yampolskiy 2018), nanorobotics and
swarm robotics (Barca and Sekercioglu 2013; Brambilla et al. 2013; Mavroidis and Ferreira 2013),
synthetic biology and artificial life (Komosinski and Adamatzky 2009; Cheng and Lu 2012; Bera 2015),
biological computing (Lamm and Unger 2011), and smart environments and the Internet of Things
(Atzori et al. 2010; Evans 2012; Raj and Raman 2017)—which all result in the world becoming
“re-enchanted”, in becoming “wild” once again, as it becomes filled with myriad diverse sources of
embodied non-human agency that can detect and respond to human beings’ actions, emotional states,
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and even thoughts in creative, meaningful, and often unpredictable ways. Both of these dynamics
result in a society whose membership has been expanded to include entities beyond just “natural”
biological human beings, and both of these dynamics would be accelerated by implementation of the
Society 5.0 paradigm in Japan or other countries.
Examples of developments in recent history that might be cited as milestones along this path to the
technological posthumanization of societies and the advent of Society 5.0 include the development of
the first general-purpose electronic computer (ENIAC) in 1945 (Mauchly 1980); the creation of the first
physical artificial neural networks, beginning around 1960 (Adhikari and Kim 2014); the introduction
of the first commercial personal computers, in the 1970s (Freiberger and Swaine 2000); the first
computer to win a match against a reigning world chess champion, in 1997 (Campbell et al. 2002);
the establishment in 2001 of what was likely the first fully automated “lights-out factory” that requires
no human workers, operated by the Japanese robotics company FANUC (Metzger 2016); the creation
of the first commercial deep brain stimulation (DBS) implants, around 2002 (Gardner 2013); the first
use of therapeutic social robots (e.g., PARO), around 2004 (Shibata et al. 2004); the introduction of
robot chefs that prepare food and robot waiters that deliver food to tables in restaurants, around
2006 (Hong 2006; Chen 2016; Nguyen 2016); the growth of the Internet of Things to include roughly
18 billion networked devices (Nordrum 2016), along with the initial mass marketing of voice-activated
smart home assistants (Chung et al. 2017; López et al. 2017) and VR game systems (Chang et al. 2016;
Shelstad et al. 2017), all occurring around 2016; and the launch in 2018 of the first driverless car service
in the US (Buncombe 2018; Young 2018).
3.1.6. 20th-Century De-Posthumanization as a Historical Anomaly
As Figure 2 suggests, the period extending from roughly the 1960s through the 1990s represents
a historical anomaly of a sort that had not been seen for tens of thousands of years and (especially
with the impending appearance of Society 5.0) might never be seen again: it was a period of
extreme “non-posthumanization”, in which the world’s most technologically and economically
advanced societies were no longer non-technologically posthumanized but had not yet become
technologically posthumanized.
With the benefit of hindsight—as we now begin to appreciate the societal implications of
emerging forms of artificial agency—it is possible to see that the dynamics of industrialization and
de-posthumanization that occurred in developed economies over the course of the 20th century
reflected not a transition to a permanent new anthropocentric order but a temporary period in which
developed economies became atypically anthropocentrized and de-posthumanized.
The semi-automated factory assembly lines that became ubiquitous throughout developed
economies in the 1960s and 1970s—and later, the “cubicle farms” (Danninger et al. 2005; Rockmann and
Pratt 2015) of the 1990s, with rows of office workers sitting before identical desktop computers—arguably
represented the most anthropocentric and non-posthumanized workplaces in history. Rather than
being surrounded by much-valued domesticated animals that needed to be nurtured, cared for,
trained, cajoled, and persuaded, within such environments the human worker stood alone and
supreme as the sole intelligent social actor. Within the societies in which such automating technologies
became prevalent, human beings found themselves surrounded by highly effective (but passive
and asocial) electronic tools that would do exactly—and only—what they were instructed to do by
their human masters. It is only in recent years that various forms of AI have begun to develop
social and emotional capacities and degrees of autonomy that allow them to become meaningful
companions and competitors to the creative, social human intellect (Kanda and Ishiguro 2013; Ford 2015;
Pfadenhauer 2015; Sachs et al. 2015; Vallverdú 2015; Yakut 2018; Mazzone and Elgammal 2019).
3.2. Categorization of the Anticipated Participants in Society 5.0
Applying the concept of posthumanization developed above, it is possible to distinguish six
types of potential entities that may come to be participants in or members of Society 5.0: (1) “natural”
Soc. Sci. 2019, 8, 148 18 of 39
biological human beings; (2) artificially augmented human beings; and (3) metahuman; (4) epihuman;
(5) parahuman; and (6) nonhuman beings. The differences between these types of entities can be
characterized using Ingarden’s model of the human being as a three-layered emergent whole; brief
definitions of the categories are presented in the discussion of them below, while more formal technical
definitions that draw on Ingarden’s framework are presented in supplementary Figures S1 and S2.
Note that there are some limited cases in which an entity may belong to more than one category
simultaneously; these are highlighted in supplementary Figure S3. Selected examples of members of
the six categories are presented in Figure 3 and discussed in the subsections below.
Figure 3. The technologically posthumanized Society 5.0 is expected to incorporate six categories of
participants whose analogues existed in earlier non-technologically posthumanized societies.
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3.2.1. “Natural” Biological Human Beings
“Natural” biological human beings are those that have not been qualitatively transformed
by posthumanization; from a phenomenological anthropological perspective, a natural biological
human being can be understood as an entity that possesses a physical body, sensory-emotional soul,
and intentional «I» of the sort that are unextraordinary for the human being as an emergent whole,
as described by Ingarden (1970).
Throughout the history of Societies 1.0 through 4.0, such natural biological human beings
have served as the central actors responsible for gathering and analyzing data, making decisions,
and undertaking actions within societies; they are the “glue” that has always held human societies
together. In comparison to other types of actors that filled some role in societies (e.g., domesticated
animals in Society 2.0 or, more recently, specialized artificial agents in Society 4.0), natural biological
human beings are highly adaptable “generalists” who possess a wide range of sensorimotor
and cognitive capacities; they learn new skills quickly, possess considerable imagination and
problem-solving skills, and can function with a high degree of autonomy. However, they are
also subject to physical limitations (e.g., the need for regular sleep) and possess many cognitive
limitations (e.g., cognitive biases and imperfect memory) that often cause them to behave in irrational,
ineffective, or even counterproductive and harmful ways within society.
The natural biological human beings who will enjoy membership in Society 5.0 are not a monolithic
bloc of homogeneous entities: even before taking into account the bewildering variety of artificially
augmented, metahuman, epihuman, parahuman, and nonhuman beings that will participate in Society
5.0, the category of “natural” biological human beings itself already encompasses a remarkably vast and
diverse universe of entities. As Figure 3 suggests, that group includes both more and less “prototypical”
cases. Among less prototypical cases one might identify persons who are comatose or asleep, who
are physically impaired, who are suffering from dementia, who possess emotional disorders, or who
are currently intoxicated or hallucinating; their state of physical and cognitive development may
range from that of an embryo or infant to that of an adult or an elderly individual who is near death
(Bogin 1999; Government of Japan 2016a, p. 22; Slater and Bremner 2017; Hooyman and Kiyak 2018;
Webster et al. 2018).
In keeping with the phenomenologically descriptive nature of Ingarden’s anthropology, it should
be emphasized that the distinction between more and less prototypical cases is not a normative one
entailing a value judgment, nor is it meant to suggest, for example, that children or comatose individuals
are in any way less “human”. Quite the opposite: the explicit highlighting of such manifold ways of
existing “less prototypically” as a human being is meant to serve as a reminder of the fact that such
conceptual stereotypes exist and must be actively challenged, if one wishes to appreciate the potential
membership of Society 5.0 in its full diversity. As a historical matter, when scholars have attempted to
imagine a generic “human being” as part of some thought experiment, they have often instinctively
pictured a well-educated, healthy, conscious, adult human being (often of a particular gender, race,
nationality, religion, and socioeconomic status) as a sort of prototypical placeholder that represents
all human beings (Humphrey 1984, p. 7; Law 2011, p. 1). It has been suggested that 20th-century
phenomenological approaches to studying the human being—despite their attempts to avoid such
stereotypical thinking by temporarily “bracketing” cultural preconceptions and focusing on entities
as they actually reveal themselves—may not, in themselves, be capable of avoiding such culturally
driven “overrepresentation” of a particular vision of the human person (Ferreira da Silva 2015). It is
possible, though, that the fact that Ingarden’s anthropological model of the human being is based
in a generalized systems theory (Ingarden 1974) may mitigate some of the problems associated with
phenomenologically grounded anthropologies that employ a more explicitly anthropocentric approach.
Moreover, one of the values of critical posthumanist thought is that it continually reminds us that
there is no “typical” human being that can serve as an object of study; it is impossible for any single
individual to possess the full and astonishingly diverse set of traits that all particular human beings
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collectively do (or may) possess. The Ingardenian phenomenological framework utilized in this text
might thus be beneficially understood in light of that posthumanist caveat.
As Figure 3 suggests, there are also more or less “prototypical” human uses of technology. Within
the context of technological posthumanization and Society 5.0, the routine use of “simple” everyday
technology is not enough to disqualify a person from being a “natural” biological human being; the fact
that one wears clothing, uses eyeglasses or a hearing aid, drives an automobile, or uses a telephone or
desktop computer does not exclude one from the category of natural biological human beings. The use
of conventional medicines, surgical procedures, somatic cell gene therapy (SCGT), and medical devices
is also consistent with status as a natural biological human being, insofar as such technologies are
used for restorative therapeutic purposes and do not qualitatively transform an individual’s physical
body, sensory-emotional soul, or intentional «I» to possess capacities that exceed or differ from what is
common among human beings.
3.2.2. Artificially Augmented Human Beings
An “artificially augmented” human being is still undeniably a true human being; however, it has
undergone some significant alteration or enhancement, as a result of which its capacities are no
longer simply those of a human being still existing in its purely “natural” biological state. From a
phenomenological anthropological perspective, such an alteration involves grafting some new physical
element onto the “ontic fundament” of a person’s existing physical biological body or granting the
person extraordinary new powers over the environment, which are reflected in the fact that the person’s
«I» of conscious awareness is able to “intend” the surrounding world in ways that are not possible for
ordinary members of society—for example, by “willing” certain environmental changes into existence.
For example, a person who has lost an arm in an accident and receives a sensorimotor
neuroprosthetic robotic arm developed using groundbreaking technologies (Farina and Aszmann 2014;
Pazzaglia and Molinari 2016) that possesses enhanced (or different) capacities has not undergone
a change that radically alters the person’s fundamental nature as a human being; at the same time,
though, the creation of such a sophisticated, intimate, and enduring human-machine interface means
that the person is no longer simply a “natural” biological human being. Rather, the individual has
become artificially augmented.
According to the definitions formulated here, not every use of technology gives rise to “artificially
augmented” human beings. In a sense, driving an automobile, typing at a computer, wearing eyeglasses,
or even wearing clothing creates an artificial human-machine interface. However, such technological
devices do not become “integrated into” their users’ bodies: the interface is a superficial one that is
regularly and effortlessly broken (e.g., by getting out of a car or removing one’s glasses before going
to sleep) in a way that does not require any invasive procedures or alterations to a person’s physical
biological body.
The types of technologies that would give rise to an artificially augmented human being in
the technologically posthumanized Society 5.0 involve the physical incorporation of a device into
an individual’s body; such devices include deep brain stimulation (DBS) implants (Kraemer 2011),
retinal implants (Linsenmeier 2005; Weiland et al. 2005; Viola and Patrinos 2007), and cochlear
implants (Ochsner et al. 2015), along with future visual cortical implants (Thanos et al. 2007) and
memory implants that build upon emerging technologies for memory modification (Han et al. 2009;
Josselyn 2010; Ramirez et al. 2013). Such devices may be wirelessly networked and, to some extent,
remotely controllable (Denning et al. 2010; Clark and Fu 2012; Zheng et al. 2014), thereby incorporating
their human user into the Internet of Things. Often the state of existing as an artificially augmented
human being is a reversible one; such augmentative devices can typically be removed, returning their
users to their previous state as natural biological human beings. However, in some cases, the use of
such devices is meant to be continuous and permanent, and in almost all cases it creates a more stable
and enduring human-machine interface than that which is created when natural biological human
beings don a pair of eyeglasses or get behind the wheel of an automobile.
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It may appear arbitrary to consider the use of some technologies (such as clothing and eyeglasses)
a characteristic of “natural” biological human beings, while the possession of other technologies (like
cognitive neuroprostheses or robotic limbs that grant superhuman capacities) causes an individual to
be classified as an artificially augmented human being. Indeed, it has been suggested that attempts to
identify futuristic technologies as instruments of a novel “cyborgization” are misguided, as even the
use of simple or archaic technologies gives rise to cyborgs. For example, it has been argued that the
(now commonplace) act of watching a film is a sort of cyborgizing experience in which moving images
knit together the human body and an external apparatus (McReynolds 2015), while printed books and
even Paleolithic art can be understood as powerful virtual reality technologies (Ryan 1999, 2001) whose
effects are not entirely dissimilar from those of the futuristic neural jacks and cyberdecks of cyberpunk
fiction (Charrette et al. 1989; Shirow 2009). If the term “cyborg” is taken to mean (more or less) “a
tool-using human being”, a human being who is both biological and technological, then it becomes
quite reasonable to argue that, in a sense, human beings have always been cyborgs (Hakken 1999;
Clark 2003).
However, if the word “cyborg” is employed in that sense for practical reasons, it becomes useful to
find another term to describe those human beings (ubiquitous in science fiction and increasingly present
in the real world) who have undergone more radical forms of technological transformation. Here,
“artificially augmented human being” is used in that sense: the term acknowledges the fact that within
the context of an analysis of prospective members of Society 5.0, a “full-body” cyborg who possesses
infrared vision, superhuman strength and memory, and a radically non-humanoid morphology and
who requires regular recharging and specialized robotic maintenance is “posthumanized” in a way that
someone who wears eyeglasses or clothing is not—and that such a being would participate differently
in society, as a result.
The extent to which a human being may be artificially augmented remains unclear. Attempts to
conceptualize the limits beyond which a human being may not be further technologically augmented
without dying or ceasing to be “human” have been undertaken in both works of speculative fiction
(e.g., the concept of a quantifiable “essence loss” (Charrette et al. 1989)) and more serious scholarly
analyses (e.g., the concept of “Factor X” (Fukuyama 2002)). The fact that, for example, an insect
can undergo a radical structural and functional metamorphosis (Ingarden 1961, pp. 321, 325–26;
1965b, pp. 54, 57–58) without ceasing to be the same insect would seem to challenge any a priori
presumption that biological entities are inherently incapable of preserving their identity and nature
through quite dramatic change.
While the types of emerging technologies that will give rise to such artificially augmented human
members of Society 5.0 are novel—and Society 5.0 will thus differ in important ways from any previous
human cultures—throughout history, non-technologically posthumanized societies have included
individuals who satisfy the definition of artificially augmented human beings. For example, political
and military leaders who possess great influence or authority within a society are, in effect, “artificially
augmented” human beings; they have been granted a social power to control other human beings
and to reshape the environment in a way that exceeds the direct physical capacities of their natural
biological bodies: they can construct roads and bridges and palaces and wage warfare against other
populations not using their bare hands but by speaking instructions that cause other human members
of their society to act in a particular way (French and Raven 1959; Weber 1968; Brauer and Bourhis 2006;
Fiske and Berdahl 2007). In such cases, a leader’s artificially augmented capacities are brought about
not through neuroprosthetic technologies but through the non-technological mechanisms of social
roles, expectations, and institutions. Similar dynamics are found in societies in which priests, shamans,
or other spiritual leaders are believed to possess supernatural powers; within their communities, such
individuals are not seen as “ordinary” members of society but as persons whose capacities to shape
the environment have been augmented beyond what is naturally possible (Holdrege 1990; Sharabi and
Shalev 2018). While the presence of artificially augmented human beings will take on a new form in
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Society 5.0, it is thus not an entirely new phenomenon but an element that has been present in diverse
human societies throughout history.
3.2.3. Metahuman Beings
In recent decades, the term “metahuman” has been employed to describe diverse types
of superhuman, otherly human, quasi-human, or non-human beings, in contexts ranging from
psychological analyses of human nature (Maslow 1971) to discussions of artificial intelligence (Jaki 1988;
McCorduck 2004), manifestos for theoretically grounded posthumanist performance art (Del Val and
Sorgner 2011; Del Val et al. 2011), posthumanist scholarship (Tirosh-Samuelson and Mossman 2012;
Ferrando 2013), and popular culture (Milán 1986; Charrette et al. 1989). Such definitions disagree
dramatically in meaning, which highlights the still unsettled state of terminology used to describe
posthumanized beings. (Such unclarity is further evidenced by the fact that other researchers
(e.g., Goertzel 2007) have used the term “metahuman” to describe entities that we would refer to below
as “epihuman”.) Nevertheless, in several such uses of the term it is possible to discern a shared notion
of the “metahuman” as an individual being whose origins lie in the human but which has undergone
an irreversible transformation to become a sort of quasi-human “other”.
Drawing on Ingarden’s anthropological model, a “metahuman being” is defined here as one
whose entire body has been transformed in a way that gives it a different quality from the body of a
natural biological human being. As a result of that qualitative physical change, the metahuman being’s
sensory-emotional “soul” and intentional «I» may be structured or function somewhat differently than
those of a natural biological human being; however, they are still essentially human in nature. Because
of that fact, societies may readily recognize that such beings possess a moral status and political rights
no different from those of natural biological human beings.
In the case of the technologically posthumanized Society 5.0, such metahuman beings may include
persons who have been genetically engineered through germline gene therapy (GGT) to possess
superhuman or non-human capacities (Stock 2005; Kelly 2013) or transgenic human beings with genes
introduced from non-human animals or plants (Savulescu 2003; Wilson and Haslam 2009). While
these represent new ways of being, it is possible to identify other forms of entities that have been
participants in human societies for millennia that similarly satisfy the definition of “metahuman”
beings. For example, from ancient times, diverse human cultures have accepted the presence of ghosts
and incorporeal spirits of deceased human beings, corporeal undead, and revenants of ambiguous
corporeality as “participants” in human society (Davis 1977; Campany 1991; Scurlock 1997, 2016).
In some cases, such historical metahuman beings have been viewed negatively: they have been
believed to exist as a part of human society, but as the bearer of some metaphysical “abnormality”,
a threat that lurks ominously at society’s edge. For example, historically, various cultures have
demonstrated folk beliefs in the existence of vampires (Bane 2010; Bräunlein 2012), draugar
(Chadwick 1946; Venables 2015), zombies (Venables 2015), and other corporeal undead that had
once been natural biological human beings but that, after death, were transformed irreversibly into
dangerous quasi-human “others” that are aesthetically repellent, amoral, and metaphysically deficient.
At the same time, many historical cultures have held that after the death of its physical body, a natural
biological human being may become positively transformed to acquire a new manner of existence;
this concept is formally expressed, for example, in the traditional Catholic teaching regarding the
“communio sanctorum”, according to which the saints already in heaven are believed to remain an
invisible part of human society and, through their prayers, work actively to aid those human beings
who are still going about their everyday lives on earth, just as those living on earth can aid the souls in
purgatory that are preparing to enter heaven (The Holy See 2003, pp. 268–72).
There are indications that this historical dichotomy by which metahuman beings in
non-technologically posthumanized societies may be viewed either as dangerous, corrupted beings or as
benevolent, exalted beings may manifest itself in the case of the technologically posthumanized Society
5.0, as well. This is suggested, for example, by the contemporary debate between bioconservatives
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(Fukuyama 2002; Roache and Clarke 2009; Bardziński 2015) who argue vociferously that such alteration
of the human species is a dangerous, immoral debasing of human nature that should be prevented and
transhumanists who argue that the creation of such beings is a positive step in the evolution of humanity
that should be energetically pursued (Bostrom 2005; Roache and Clarke 2009; Bardziński 2015).
3.2.4. Epihuman Beings
The term “epihuman” has been used recently in contexts that suggest a being whose capacities or
performance are just “beyond” those of an ordinary human being (Hall 2007; Tucker 2007; Yampolskiy
and Fox 2012; Manzocco 2019). Here, though, we draw upon the original meaning of the Greek prefix
“epi-” as “being upon” or “being supported upon a surface” (Liddell and Scott 1897, p. 524) to describe
an entity that is somehow “built” or “rests” upon ordinary human beings. Employing this study’s
phenomenological anthropological model, an “epihuman being” can be defined as an entity whose
physical “body” comprises one or more human ontic fundaments that are functionally linked in a
special way. In effect, an epihuman entity is an emergent collective whole that is “built upon” a
foundation of multiple human beings.
In the case of the technologically posthumanized Society 5.0, such epihuman beings might
include collective “hive minds” that have been created by establishing direct technologically
facilitated links between the brains of a society’s human members, allowing real-time communication
through neuroprosthetic devices or other advanced brain-computer interfaces (Fleischmann 2009;
McIntosh 2010; Roden 2014, p. 39). Such sophisticated multi-agent systems may allow people in
different places to experience one another’s sensory perceptions, emotions, or even memories; such
hive minds are able to manifest shared sentiments and arrive at collective decisions that—while
grounded in the cognitive activity of the hive mind’s individual members—are the sentiments and
decisions of the emergent epihuman entity as a whole, and not of its individual members.
While the possibility of creating such neuroprosthetically facilitated hive minds is a novel one
that is only becoming feasible along with the development of Society 5.0 technologies, there are many
other types of epihuman entities that have been prominent features of human cultures since ancient
times. Such higher-order entities lack the single material “core” that an individual human person
possesses; they are instead held together across generations by links such as a common language
and culture (Ingarden 1961, pp. 320–22; 1965b, pp. 52–54). For example, families, clans, religious
communities, nations, governments, and commercial organizations (Hendry 2016) all satisfy the
definition of “epihuman” entities formulated here: it is quite natural to speak about a particular
family’s “plans”, a country’s “decision to develop its own space program”, a religious group’s “hopes”
and “fears”, or a company’s “strategic objectives”; such emotions, decisions, or goals are attributed to
the collective entities as a whole and may or may not reflect the emotions, decisions, or goals of all
their individual members.
Viewed from this phenomenological anthropological perspective, the advanced human-computer
interfaces that may lead to the emergence of new types of “hive minds” in Society 5.0 are seen as
parallels to the ancient processes of public debates, voting, societal roles and expectations, and other
(non-technological) mechanisms for creating collective entities and arriving at shared decisions that
have been employed in non-technologically posthumanized societies throughout human history.
3.2.5. Parahuman Beings
The term “parahuman” has been employed in various contexts (Nikolchina 2005; Hall 2007;
Tucker 2007; Yampolskiy and Fox 2012; Beckman 2013; Stadler 2017; Manzocco 2019) with no universally
accepted meaning; in general, though, the term suggests entities that are not in themselves human but
that accompany, resemble, or exist alongside human beings. Drawing on this study’s phenomenological
anthropological model, here a “parahuman being” may be defined as an entity that possesses an ontic
fundament whose materials, structures, processes, or systems are not directly dependent on the sort of
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ontic fundament associated with a natural biological human body but which nonetheless displays
significant human-like characteristics.
In the case of the technologically posthumanized Society 5.0, such parahuman beings
might include future robots that possess a human-like physical form (i.e., “androids”)
(Silvera-Tawil and Garbutt 2015; Watanabe et al. 2018) and a human-like degree of artificial general
intelligence (Yampolskiy and Fox 2012; Ramamoorthy and Yampolskiy 2018), as well as artificial
entities encountered within virtual reality that resemble human beings in their appearance and
behavior (Jerald 2015; Barfield and Williams 2018). While the technological nature of such entities
is a novel feature of Society 5.0, the incorporation of parahuman entities into human society is an
ancient phenomenon.
For example, in many cultures around the world, a society’s human members have long interacted
regularly with beings such as horses, dogs, dolphins, apes, cats, and other highly intelligent animals
that display emotions, learning capacity, and other forms of mental activity that appear human-like to
at least some degree. It is because such beings seem to possess some human-like mental characteristics
that they do not simply share a space with human beings but can instead “accompany” us in our lives in
meaningful ways as (limited) participants in our society (Plous 1993; Wilks 1999; Tovey 2003; Buller and
Morris 2007; Hobson-West 2007). Similarly, in many historical societies, human beings have believed
that they shared the world with entities such as angels and demons, anthropomorphic monsters, or a
personal deity that possesses some human-like mental characteristics and takes an interest in the affairs
of the society’s human members (Beckman 2013). Drawing on Ingarden (1931, 1957, 1968, 1988) analysis
of the mode of being of fictional characters, from a phenomenological ontological perspective, even
literary characters that are universally known to be creations of the human imagination may nonetheless
“exist” in a certain sense (Thomasson 2003a, 2003b) and participate (in their own limited fashion)
in a society’s fabric by contributing meaning and influencing the society’s dynamics. Parahuman
beings have thus been a longstanding fixture of non-technologically posthumanized human societies:
the incorporation of androids, artificial general intelligences (AGIs), and other parahuman beings
into Society 5.0 is in one sense a novel development but, in another sense, it has strong precedent in
earlier societies.
As the detailed definition of parahuman beings presented in Figure S2 suggests, for purposes
of this study’s phenomenological analysis of potential members of Society 5.0, the key criterion for
parahuman beings is that they at least occasionally give the impression of possessing a human-like
“soul” and intentional «I». The way in which Society 5.0 will be experienced by its human members will
depend on whether androids, AGIs, and other synthetic beings appear to their human acquaintances to
possess human-like minds: the fact that human beings cannot know firsthand whether such artificial
beings actually possess human-like mental experiences is not relevant for categorizing such beings
in this anthropological framework—although the question of whether artificial beings are indeed
sentient and sapient is, for example, a critical one when carrying out political, ethical, or theological
investigations of such beings’ rights and responsibilities (if any) and appropriate roles within society
(Wallach and Allen 2008; Gunkel 2012).
Similarly, the phenomenological anthropological justification for classifying fictional literary
characters as parahuman (rather than nonhuman) entities is the fact that while the reader of a novel
or viewer of a film rationally understands that such characters do not actually possess a “soul” or
«I» (and would readily admit as much, if asked), the process of immersion in a fictional work is so
transformative that readers or viewers can temporarily forget that its characters are “only” fictional and
begin to wonder what the characters are feeling, what their motivations are, what they are planning to
do next, etc. (Ingarden 1931, 1957, 1968; Ryan 1999, 2001).
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3.2.6. Nonhuman Beings
For purposes of this study, a “nonhuman” being can be defined from a phenomenological
anthropological perspective as an entity that does not possess a sensory-emotional system or intentional
system that gives the impression of being significantly human-like.
Rocks, flowers, insects, houses, pieces of furniture, books, stars, clouds, rivers, and countless other
types of nonhuman entities fill our lives; however, most of these cannot be considered “members of”
or “participants in” human society. Nevertheless, in non-technologically posthumanized societies,
there have been some types of beings that have been considered (limited) participants in the fabric of
the societies, despite the fact that they did not display any human-like mental activity. For example,
in some cultures it is possible for a particularly large, ancient, rare, beautiful, sacred, or otherwise
notable tree to be considered a sort of “member” of the local community and a meaningful participant
in society (Stone 1972, 2010; King et al. 1997; Dafni 2006; Cloke and Pawson 2008; Selvamony 2014),
even if it is not able to speak or demonstrate emotions. Similarly, non-anthropomorphic monsters,
impersonal deities or supernatural forces, and examples of simple animal life that evidently lack
human-like sensation, emotion, and self-awareness have, in different times and places, been considered
by a society’s human members to be meaningful contributors to the society.
In the case of the technologically posthumanized Society 5.0, nonhuman beings that might
contribute meaningfully to such a society—and come to be considered “members” of it—despite
their lack of human-like mentality might include synthetic biological computers whose behavior
is not modelled on that of the human brain (Lamm and Unger 2011), nanorobotic swarms
(Mavroidis and Ferreira 2013), and AGIs that possess radically nonhuman cognitive structures and
dynamics (Yampolskiy 2015a, 2015b).
4. Discussion and Recommendations
In addressing this study’s first research question, Figure 3, and Figures S1 and S2 and the related
discussion have illustrated qualitative differences between the diverse types of human and non-human
members that are expected to participate in Society 5.0, understood in terms of Ingarden’s philosophical
anthropology. The second question—about how it is possible to conceptualize the societal dynamics
that will cause Society 5.0 to possess a different makeup than Society 4.0—has been explored through the
account of historical processes of non-technological and technological posthumanization, as illustrated
in Figure 2. A suggested answer to the third question—about how the anticipated members of Society
5.0 differ qualitatively from the members of Societies 1.0 through 4.0—emerges when the responses to
the first two questions are considered together. Having developed such frameworks for categorizing,
analyzing, and understanding the anticipated participants in Society 5.0, below we point to some
implications of what they tell us about the likely nature of life in Society 5.0 and offer recommendations
relating to further study and implementation of the Society 5.0 paradigm.
4.1. Society 5.0: Is There Really Anything New Here?
There is rightfully much trepidation about the incorporation of increasingly sophisticated robots
and AI into future societies: quite serious questions exist about the growing societal role of artificial
agency from ethical, legal, political, economic, engineering, and cybersecurity perspectives. However,
this study’s results suggest that at least from an anthropological perspective, Society 5.0′s inclusion of
diverse non-human entities as participants is “nothing new”—but instead something quite ancient,
a return to the unpredictability, “wildness”, and continual encounters with the “other” that characterized
Societies 1.0 and 2.0, thanks to the prevalence of diverse non-human agency resulting from a heavy
reliance on animals as key participants in society and the societies’ religious and spiritual dimension.
It should be noted that while Society 5.0 will be technologically posthumanized in a way that no
previous society has been, it will not cease to possess the elements of non-technological posthumanization
that remain present within our contemporary Society 4.0. Instead, we can expect Society 5.0 to be a
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radically posthumanized society that includes all the forms of technological and non-technological
posthumanization reflected in Figure 3. A glimpse of Society 5.0′s future reality can already be seen,
for example, in the work of Schmickl et al. (2013), who have sought to create hybrid animal-robotic
societies (or “collective adaptive systems”) in which real biological honeybees live and labor alongside
honeybee-like robotic nodes and schools of fish include both robotic and natural biological members.
If one imagines a future society whose human members carefully tend mixed hives of robotic and
biological bees in order to produce honey for their consumption or swim leisurely amidst hybrid schools
of fish whose robotic members help the biological members to interact with the human swimmers,
then one is picturing a society that is both non-technologically and technologically posthumanized in
rich and meaningful ways. The cyber-physical infrastructure underlying Society 5.0 has the potential
to allow it to become just such a society in which diverse “naturally” human, “otherly” human, robotic,
animal, and other participants engage to create a world that is vibrant, diverse, and exotic, while
remaining human-centered.
Recommended Historical Social Scientific Analysis of Technologically Posthumanized Societies
Building on the previous observation, an overarching point suggested by this study’s results is
that because the “novel” types of technologically posthumanized beings that are expected to participate
in Society 5.0 all have analogues in earlier, non-technologically posthumanized societies, a detailed
social scientific analysis of the dynamics of earlier human cultures and civilizations (drawing, e.g.,
on anthropology, economics, history, linguistics, political science, psychology, and sociology) may be
able to offer unexpectedly robust and relevant insights into the nature of Society 5.0 and the expected
behaviors of its diverse human and non-human participants. It is thus recommended that anyone
seeking to study or implement a seemingly “novel” element of the Society 5.0 paradigm should first
search for ways in which its non-technologically posthumanizing analogues were (successfully or
unsuccessfully) incorporated into earlier societies.
4.2. Can the Society 5.0 Paradigm be Applied Outside of Japan?
While the origins of the Society 5.0 paradigm lie in Japan, the Government of Japan (2016b, p. 1)
envisions that many Society 5.0 platforms and technologies will be developed “within an internationally
open innovation system”, and preliminary efforts are already underway to apply the paradigm in other
countries. For example, Ratti (2018) describes how an experimental initiative drawing on concepts
from the Government of Japan’s Society 5.0 plan is being implemented in the Autonomous Region of
Sardinia in Italy, while Sarif (2017) explores ways in which the Society 5.0 paradigm might be applied in
Malaysia, particularly within the sphere of higher education, and Romli et al. (2018) investigate ways
in which Society 5.0 technologies might be used in the Malaysian context to strengthen parent-child
relationships and parenting literacy.
Despite such interest in applying elements of the Society 5.0 paradigm internationally, it remains
unclear whether the Society 5.0 vision as a whole can be readily applied outside of its original Japanese
cultural context. This dynamic may differentiate Society 5.0 from the Industry 4.0 paradigm, which in
the span of less than a decade has been taken up as a useful organizing concept by businesses far beyond
its place of origin in Germany. It will be remembered that Industry 4.0 primarily involves innovative
approaches to applying emerging cyber-physical technologies for the automation of manufacturing
processes (Gorecky et al. 2014; Lasi et al. 2014; Kang 2018). Because they depend preponderantly on
technological (rather than cultural) factors, new practices regarding high-tech manufacturing processes
can be transferred between different countries and cultural contexts with relative ease: a new type of
automated cyber-physical assembly line that is efficient and effective when implemented in a factory in
Germany is likely to also prove efficient and effective when implemented in a factory in China, Brazil,
or the United States.
Full implementation of the Society 5.0 paradigm, though, reaches much more deeply into a
society’s culture. It impacts not just the workplace activities of the small percentage of individuals who
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work in high-tech factories but is instead intertwined with the daily routines of all members of society:
it involves the use of advanced cyber-physical technologies to transform the nature of education,
healthcare, entertainment, social relationships, and other aspects of daily life, in order to address a
wide range of perceived social needs (Government of Japan 2016b) and to facilitate individuals’ desired
lifestyles, support their self-realization, and make their lives more meaningful, vibrant, and enjoyable
(Bryndin 2018; Keidanren Japan Business Federation; Medina-Borja 2017).
While it might appear reasonable within the Japanese context to expect that incorporating social
robotics, ambient intelligence, virtual reality, cyberspatial interfaces, neuroprosthetics, and other
cyber-physical technologies into the most intimate aspects of one’s daily routine will add more
meaning, vibrancy, and joy to one’s life, it cannot be presumed that such technologies would be
embraced in the same way by—or have similarly positive psychological, social, and cultural impacts
on—people in other countries and cultures.
Indeed, it has been observed that the Japanese attitude to emerging technologies differs significantly
from that of other countries. For example, it has been argued that Japanese society manifests a unique
“robophilia” that is partly a response to the traumatic experience of having suffered the devastation
wrought by atomic bombs during World War II, with the subsequent unspoken resolution that
Japan would never again fall behind the world’s leaders in technological innovation (Gilson 1998;
Budianto 2018). Moreover, it has been suggested that Japanese culture’s ancient mix of Shinto and
Buddhist worldviews naturally encourages the recognition of a sort of inherent animating “soul” or
“spirit” not only within rocks, trees, and streams but also within robots, which thereby enjoy a sort of
implicit kinship with human beings; that mindset differs from the attitude prevalent in Western cultures
influenced by Cartesian dualism, where artificial intelligence is understood as a process of calculation
that is readily separable from the physical substrates upon which it is performed (Morris-Suzuki 2012;
Coeckelbergh 2013; Richardson 2016).
Recommended Analysis of the Cultural Underpinnings of Society 5.0
Based on the observations above, it is recommended that when policymakers, government
agencies, and businesses in other countries are considering implementing elements of the Society 5.0
paradigm, they incorporate into their analysis an explicit investigation of how those elements of the
Government of Japan’s Society 5.0 initiative have been shaped by the unique political, philosophical,
spiritual, aesthetic, and other cultural dynamics of Japan and whether changes will need to be made
when adapting such elements of Society 5.0 for use in a very different cultural context.
4.3. How Will Government, Academia, and Industry Collaborate to Realize Society 5.0?
By its very nature, realization of the Society 5.0 vision in Japan will require close and effective
strategic collaboration between government, academia, and industry (Government of Japan 2016b),
which is already underway. For example, Fujii et al. (2018) have explored the role of Japanese
electronics manufacturers in collaborating with academia and consumers to create the technologies,
services, and societal change that will underpin Society 5.0, while Shibata et al. (2017) have investigated
the need to update and transform curricula to successfully educate those who will be called upon
to manage the future technologies of Society 5.0. Likewise, Ding (2018) has analyzed the novel
government-academia-industry relationship that will be needed to implement Society 5.0, along
with the challenge for the Government of Japan and industry to implement the radical long-term
changes needed to fully realize the Society 5.0 paradigm while simultaneously maintaining short-term
competitiveness and prosperity in a difficult economic climate.
Recommended Development of Transdisciplinary Frameworks Offering a “Shared Vocabulary”
A major challenge facing any initiative that requires such close collaboration between government,
academia, and business is the fact that each of those spheres possesses its own specialized conceptual
frameworks, methodologies, vocabularies, best practices, and workplace cultures that may be
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inscrutable even to intelligent and well-trained personnel in the other spheres. (Indeed, dramatic
differences exist even among government agencies, among academic disciplines, and among particular
industries.) Historically, one of the driving forces behind the creation of the field of cybernetics in the
1940s was a desire among researchers from diverse disciplines to develop a common vocabulary that
would allow them to understand one another’s work and forge transdisciplinary insights (Wiener 1961).
Related fields such as systems theory have also attempted to develop vocabularies and principles that
are applicable across diverse disciplines, as has (more recently) the field of enterprise architecture.
Some transdisciplinary framework of that sort will need to be adopted by proponents of the
Society 5.0 paradigm in Japan, in order (for example) to allow the neuroscientists, computer scientists,
and ergonomists who are developing a novel type of cyber-physical human-computer interface to
seamlessly communicate, debate, and strategize with the manufacturers who will produce it and the
government policymakers who are specifying its desired performance characteristics, regulating its
operation, and funding its deployment on a society-wide scale.
As part of the contribution sought from academia, the Government of Government of Japan (2016b)
has called for input and reflection on the Society 5.0 paradigm from the humanities and social sciences.
The frameworks and analyses developed in this study are aimed at providing one such conceptual
“bridge” that facilitates transdisciplinary analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the Society
5.0 paradigm and potential benefits and dangers of its implementation. By employing an approach
grounded in Ingarden’s phenomenological systems theory and attempting to get at the deepest
philosophical and anthropological foundations of Society 5.0—and its unique universe of expected
participants—it is hoped that this work can offer tools and insights (and pose new questions) that will
be of relevance to policymakers, ethicists, scientists, systems engineers, technology manufacturers,
managers, service providers, and others involved with making Society 5.0 a reality.
5. Conclusions
The Government of Japan’s development and promotion of the Society 5.0 paradigm is not simply
a theoretical exercise but a concrete real-world project whose future direction is expected to affect the
lives of many millions of people in Japan and other countries where application of elements of the
paradigm is being explored. Insofar as this study makes it easier to analyze potential positive and
negative implications of a transition to Society 5.0 (which have so far been relatively little studied),
it may thus hold some practical value.
The qualitative phenomenological anthropological and posthumanist anthropological approach
taken in this study represents just one of many possible ways of seeking to understand the bewilderingly
diverse array of human and non-human entities that are expected to participate in a fully realized
Society 5.0. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the conceptual frameworks proposed and analyses offered
here can contribute positively to facilitating much needed further analysis of the theoretical basis
and real-world implications of Japan’s pursuit of the Society 5.0 vision and its meaning for the future
of humanity.
Supplementary Materials: The following are available online at http://www.mdpi.com/2076-0760/8/5/148/s1,
Figure S1: Characteristics of Potential Types of Members of a Posthumanized Society (Part One), Figure S2:
Characteristics of Potential Types of Members of a Posthumanized Society (Part Two), Figure S3: Possibilities for
an Entity to Simultaneously Belong to Multiple Categories of Posthumanized Being.
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Ingarden, Roman. 1964. Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, vol. 1.
Ingarden, Roman. 1965a. Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt. Part 1: Formalontologie: Form und Wesen. Tübingen:
Max Niemeyer Verlag, vol. 2.
Ingarden, Roman. 1965b. Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt. Part 2: Formalontologie: Welt und Bewußtsein.
Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, vol. 2.
Ingarden, Roman. 1968. Vom Erkennen des literarischen Kunstwerks. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag.
Ingarden, Roman. 1970. Über die Verantwortung: Ihre ontischen Fundamente. Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam.
Ingarden, Roman. 1974. Über die kausale Struktur der realen Welt: Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt III. Tübingen:
Max Niemeyer Verlag.
Soc. Sci. 2019, 8, 148 34 of 39
Ingarden, Roman. 1988. O dziele literackim: Badania z pogranicza ontologii, teorii języka i filozofii literatury. Translated
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